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The Road To JeRusalem ThRough 
TahRiR squaRe: anTi-Zionism and 
PalesTine in The 2011 egyPTian 
RevoluTion
Reem Abou-el-FAdl
This article addresses an aspect of Egypt’s 2011 revolution almost 
entirely ignored in most Western media accounts: Israel and Palestine 
as prominent themes of protest. In reviewing Egyptian mobilization 
opposing normalization and in support of the Palestinian cause 
starting from Sadat’s peace initiative of the mid-1970s, the author 
shows how the anti-Mubarak movement that took off as of the mid-
2000s built on the Palestine activism and networks already in place. 
While the trigger of the revolution and the focus of its first eighteen 
days was domestic change, the article shows how domestic and for-
eign policy issues (especially Israel and Palestine) were inextricably 
intertwined, with the leadership bodies of the revolution involved 
in both. 
Amidst inteRnAtionAl interest in the extraordinary Arab uprisings of 2011, 
the Egyptian revolution arguably attracted the most sustained coverage 
and analysis. From its first days in January 2011, scenes from Tahrir 
Square captured imaginations worldwide and featured again in year-end 
media pieces eleven months later. Yet many accounts, especially in the 
United States and Israel, have overwhelmingly emphasized the domestic 
aspects of the revolution, almost totally ignoring foreign policy dimen-
sions such as Israel and Palestine that were present from the start. When 
these issues were mentioned at all, it was generally in the spirit of Josef 
Joffe’s claim that the Arab uprisings had finally exploded the “shoddy 
theory” that Palestine was a “core regional issue” when in fact it was 
nothing but a “distraction” by the region’s rulers.1 
Yet Palestine and the Egyptian-Israeli relationship are issues that reso-
nate powerfully among Egyptians. They figured prominently in protesters’ 
slogans and demands throughout 2011, just as they had informed waves 
of popular mobilization against the regime over the four previous decades. 
Since the 1940s and especially the 1950s, the liberation of Palestine was 
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regarded as an Egyptian issue, deeply internalized and intertwined with 
concerns for Egyptian national security and dignity, as well as hostility to 
Israel as a common threat to all Arabs. Indeed, the importance of these 
issues is reflected in the overlapping layers of Egyptian identity, in which 
an ancient sense of belonging to the Egyptian nation was later informed 
by religious and pan-Arab affiliations, as well as a more recent, secular 
history of resistance to Israeli aggression.2
These concepts were at the core of the pan-Arabist policies of President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, who won unprecedented levels of domestic and 
regional popular acclaim and for a time established Egypt as the preemi-
nent leader of the Arab world. Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, radically 
broke with these policies, first by aligning with the United States and 
then by making peace with Israel, which dramatically isolated Egypt in 
the Arab world. In the decades that followed, Sadat and his successor 
Hosni Mubarak made concerted efforts to reconcile Egyptians to Israel 
and to erode the popular commitment to Palestine. Yet these failed to 
eradicate from the public consciousness either the conception of Israel 
as a national enemy and threat or Egyptians’ sense of connection with 
the Palestinian people.
This article investigates anti-Zionism and the place of Palestine in 
Egypt’s 2011 revolution in light of this historical context. Certainly, long-
standing domestic grievances—focused on the growing inequality and 
poverty levels generated by the neoliberalism, corruption, and authori-
tarianism of the Mubarak regime—were at the forefront of the January 
2011 protests. Yet compounding such inequality and impunity was the 
regime’s foreign policy, which had been deeply unpopular for years. The 
revolution was spurred by the widening material and moral gap between 
the regime and the people, and Mubarak’s policies on Israel and Palestine 
formed a major fault line. This article therefore examines the ways in 
which Egyptian citizens articulated their anti-Zionism and support for 
Palestine, and how they connected these issues with their domestic griev-
ances, in the decades before and during the 2011 revolution. I begin by 
exploring the history of popular mobilization from the time of Sadat’s 
peace initiative, before considering the emboldening effects of the 2011 
revolution in which citizens raised demands for foreign policy change to 
unprecedented levels, but also faced a host of new challenges. 
enTRenching The sadaT legacy 
Under Mubarak, the tenets of Egyptian foreign policy reflected sig-
nificant continuity with the Sadat era. Key to both was the marshaling 
of state resources toward “normalizing” Egyptian-Israeli relations at the 
regional level and discrediting the Palestinian cause at the domestic level. 
Mubarak also preserved Sadat’s U.S. orientation and economic liberaliza-
tion project, al-infitah al-iqtisadi. 
JPS4102_02_Abou-el-Fadl.indd   7 27/02/12   11:58 AM
8 JouRnal oF PalesTine sTudies
Sadat had endeavored to prepare the Egyptian public for his dramatic 
foreign policy change by adopting domestic policies “aimed at changing 
the complex of values prevalent in society.”3 These targeted particularly 
the Arab orientation and commitment to Palestine that had character-
ized the Nasser era. Official discourse, the state media machine, and 
national education curricula under Sadat were all reshaped to project 
the logic of “Egypt-first” and to discredit Nasser’s Arab policies as costly 
and futile adventures. Public reeducation efforts targeted not only the 
Palestinian cause but also the Palestinian people, who were scapegoated 
as responsible for Egyptian political and economic woes and smeared 
with accusations of having sold their land to the Zionists.4 Egypt’s own 
Palestinian community became suspect as security threats and deprived 
of the considerable educational, employment, and political opportunities 
and rights they had enjoyed under Nasser. Meanwhile, Sadat combined 
sponsorship of Islamist groups with repressive measures to counter and 
erode the support base of the Nasserists and the Left.
Mubarak entrenched these policies further when he became presi-
dent after Sadat’s assassination in October 1981. With the advent of the 
Oslo peace process in the 1990s, he established for Egypt the role of 
regional mediator. As talks began to break down, “Egypt’s role became 
more direct, Mubarak and his officials acting as a channel for U.S. and 
Israeli pressure on the PA [Palestinian Authority] through the mechanism 
of security cooperation.”5 Mubarak also pushed for regional economic 
integration under U.S. auspices. This included trade normalization with 
Israel: Egypt, the United States, and Israel signed the Qualified Industrial 
Zones (QIZ) agreement in 2004.6
Mubarak’s embrace of the U.S. “war on terror” overlapped with his 
repression of Egypt’s Islamists and later his role in putting down Hamas. 
With responsibility for these areas transferred from the foreign minis-
try to the general intelligence apparatus, Egypt’s relations with Israel 
reached unprecedented levels of partnership. Their cooperation included 
coordinated plans to undermine the Hamas-led Palestinian government 
in 2006, keeping the Rafah border crossing closed after Israel’s siege on 
Gaza began in 2007, building a wall to seal off the Gaza tunnels, and, 
while sponsoring reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas, exert-
ing considerable pressure on the latter whenever talks stalled under the 
weight of the imbalance.7
anTi-noRmaliZaTion, PalesTine, and The sTRuggle 
againsT mubaRak
Under Sadat’s new order, certain social sectors long opposed to Egypt’s 
Arabist policies and support for the Palestinian cause—notably big busi-
ness and high-ranking security officials—were empowered. Meanwhile, 
lower income groups, promised prosperity under Egypt’s American 
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neoliberal turn, were influenced by the media campaigns discrediting 
Palestinians. These developments were reflected in the opinion polls of 
the late 1970s, which seemed to indicate a moderation in Egyptian atti-
tudes toward Israel, reinforcing the impression of widespread, though 
tacit, public approval for Sadat’s drive toward Camp David. A sense of 
shame, tempered by weary resignation, greeted the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli 
peace treaty. Its acceptance was encouraged by the official media cam-
paign and promises that peace would lead to justice for the Palestinians.8 
Yet by 1981, public outrage at Israeli bombings in Iraq and Lebanon 
compelled a rethinking of these assumptions. Opposition to peace 
with Israel and commitment to the Palestinian cause had been publicly 
expressed as early as the mid-1970s and continued to recur intermittently 
across Egypt with varying degrees of intensity. Politically, strategies 
for registering dissent, or “repertoires of contention,” took the form of 
anti-normalization campaigns and support for Palestinian or Arab resis-
tance. Socially, these strategies were underpinned by cultural expres-
sions of shared identity as well as common stories of struggle against 
Israel. These “contentious identity” narratives drew upon Egyptian-Arab, 
Islamic, and leftist political traditions and symbols.9 Among the wider 
population, they were reflected in phenomena such as the folk hero sta-
tus accorded to Egyptian soldier Suleiman Khater, who was tried in an 
Egyptian military court for shooting dead seven Israelis in the Sinai who 
had disregarded warnings that they were trespassing at an Egyptian mili-
tary post. Khater’s death in prison in 1986 was widely believed to have 
been carried out by the regime.10 Also indicative of public sentiments 
was the popularity of cultural production emphasizing Egypt’s history of 
war with Israel—such as 1996 blockbuster film Nasser 56—and a boycott 
movement responding to the Al-Aqsa intifada that compelled Sainsbury’s 
supermarkets to shut down in Egypt in 2001.
Popular mobilization following the peace agreements, which occurred 
both spontaneously and with activist encouragement, had all the elements 
of a movement in the making. In terms of organizational structures, 
the licensed opposition was rarely involved. Parties such as the leftist 
Al-Tagammu’ Party and the Arab Democratic Nasserist Party11 tradition-
ally defended the Palestine cause but kept within the narrow limits set 
by the regime, which permitted strong critiques of Israeli policy (includ-
ing the highlighting of Palestinian suffering) but absolutely prohibited 
any critical discussion of Egypt’s role. The principal challenges to the 
emergence of the movement, then, were the quietism of the opposition 
parties (interested party members increasingly worked within unlicensed 
organizations), divisions within the opposition as a whole, and the initial 
reluctance of nonparty activists to confront Mubarak’s regime directly. 
Negotiating these challenges, the first wave of Palestine-related activ-
ism under Mubarak was led by independent activists from the Committee 
for the Defence of National Culture and centered on anti-normalization. 
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This pioneering group was formed in the late 1970s by leftist and Arabist 
writers, journalists, artists, filmmakers, and academics who viewed cul-
ture as the “gravest route to reshaping a people’s consciousness” and 
considered any form of cultural boycott an “act of popular resistance.”12 
The committee, which protested Israel’s participation in the Cairo Book 
Fair in the early 1980s, employed an array of repertoires including public 
debates and commemorations, issuing statements, and publishing the cir-
cular Al-Muwagaha (“Confrontation”) as well as pamphlets and books.13 
This early phase also witnessed waves of spontaneous popular dis-
sent prompted by specific Israeli actions, such as the 1982 invasion of 
Lebanon, the 1985 bombing of the PLO headquarters in Tunis, and the 
brutal crackdown on the first intifada (1987–90).14 Often, these ad hoc but 
increasingly broad-based groupings dissolved with time, only to re-form 
spontaneously, including the same activists, in response to a new trig-
ger. Among these organizations, the 1987 Egyptian National Committee 
in Support of the Palestinian Uprising is noteworthy. It introduced the 
practice of calling on citizens throughout Egypt to establish their own 
local committees to coordinate with the central body in Cairo. The com-
mittee’s “broad representation of the active political forces in Egypt was 
an important signal to the Egyptian government that support for the 
Palestinian cause is an issue above party politics and above all other 
divisions in Egyptian society.”15
During the mid-1990s, confronting a rise in violent Islamist extremism, 
Mubarak introduced a host of counterterrorism measures that enabled 
him to further stifle political dissent. He also used the 1993 Oslo accords 
to help legitimize Egypt’s closer ties with Israel. This spawned new orga-
nizations in 1995–96, including the Arab Committee in Support of the 
Islamic Resistance in Lebanon and Palestine, the Popular Movement for 
the Resistance and Boycott of Israel, and the Arab Committee for the 
Resistance of Normalization in the Fields of Agriculture and Water, which 
published Al-Muqawama (“Resistance”), Al-Sira’ (“The Struggle”), and 
Al-Fallah Al-’Arabi (“The Arab Farmer”), respectively.16 These publica-
tions were irregular and mainly dependent on sympathetic printing com-
panies. All three organizations included members from across opposition 
parties, unions, media, universities, and art institutions. In 1997, such 
activists took a unified stand against a number of Egyptian intellectuals 
who had signed the “Copenhagen Declaration.” This document launched 
the “International Alliance for Arab-Israeli Peace” and became a target 
for Egypt’s anti-normalizers.17 
With the September 2000 outbreak of the Al-Aqsa intifada, popular 
mobilization resurged. The newly formed Egyptian Popular Committee 
in Solidarity with the Palestinian Intifada was a truly collaborative phe-
nomenon in which leftists, Nasserists, liberals, the Muslim Brotherhood 
(youth, not leaders), as well as welfare and rights groups, all participated, 
irrespective of political and historical differences.18 Committee members 
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in charge of large-scale aid convoys noted the significant volume of 
donations coming from Egypt’s rural and urban poor.19 The General 
Egyptian Committee for the Boycott of American and Zionist Goods and 
Companies was formed around the same time by popular initiative.20 
On Egyptian campuses, students were politicized by the 2000 intifada; 
high school students also participated in demonstrations. One student 
group, bemoaning the lack of direct ties with Palestinians, launched the 
Cairo to Camps initiative at the American University in Cairo in 2002. 
These students spent their summers with Palestinian young people as 
volunteers in Lebanon’s refugee camps.21 According to cofounder Lina 
Attalah, “Living in the camps for one month, we exchanged experiences 
with Palestinian youth and transcended the romanticization of Palestine 
as an imaginary. We also hosted Palestinians, challenging issues of 
mobility.”22 Looking back at this period, Amr Ezz, a leader of the 6 April 
Youth Movement, which played a prominent role in the 2011 revolution, 
remarked that “Palestine was the one issue that would gather us all, that 
would mobilize the largest demonstrations. . . . We felt unity with our 
Palestinians siblings as an enslaved people, liberating itself.”23
These broad-based Palestine demonstrations in the early 2000s were 
critical to the galvanization of Egyptian “street politics” that culmi-
nated in January 2011.24 Under a regime that permitted no domestic 
criticism, the years 2000–2004 marked a brief but productive phase 
in which foreign policy demands served also as 
a proxy for domestic dissent. Indeed, the close 
links between the two often helped citizens over-
come their fears, such that Palestine demonstra-
tions would regularly end in chants against the 
Mubarak regime. Film director Hala Galal recalls 
slogans at the 2002 protests over Israel’s massive 
Operation Defensive Shield assault on the West 
Bank: “We haven’t forgotten you, Palestine; we are 
also occupied!”25 This link was again made explicit in 2003 when tens 
of thousands of Egyptians protested the U.S. invasion of Iraq: “chanters 
coupled their outrage against the United States and Israel with critiques 
of Mubarak and his sons.”26 
It was after the U.S. occupation of Iraq that a number of Egyptian 
activists began to question their long-time adherence (along with oppo-
sition parties) to the discursive and practical limits of dissent laid down 
by the regime. As Egyptian Socialist Party leader and long-time Palestine 
activist Ahmad Bahaa’ Sha’baan later recalled, 
our questions about the absence of an official Egyptian 
role intensified, and we decided that we had to change 
the regime, America’s pillar in the region. . . . I wrote at 
the time that if we wanted to help the Arabs we must 
work domestically against the complicity between the 
The broad-based Palestine 
demonstrations in the 
early 2000s were critical 
to the galvanization of 
Egyptian “street politics” 
that culminated in 
January 2011.
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regime and Egyptian intellectuals. They could pour insults 
on America or Israel under the protection of state security, 
but domestic dissent was forbidden.27 
This auto-critique enabled activists to take the unprecedented step of 
organizing demonstrations unambiguously focused on domestic griev-
ances. The turning point came in 2004, when a loose coalition called 
Kifaya (“Enough”)28 was formed that openly challenged the notions of 
tamdid (extension) and tawrith (hereditary succession) with regard to 
Mubarak’s presidency. The coalition built on the networks developed dur-
ing Palestine-related protests. Kifaya cofounder Sha’baan explains that it 
was the experience of Palestine activism that made possible the collective 
decision to break the boundaries set by the regime and directly contest 
its authoritarian rule. Kifaya’s statements were also strongly informed by 
pan-Arabism, Sha’baan affirms. The first Bayan ila-l-Umma (“Statement 
to the Nation”), for example, warns against the interlocking threats of 
dictatorship and “aggression against Arab lands.” Kifaya gave rise to a 
number of similar movements, most recently the National Association for 
Change, all focused on removing Mubarak, but whose grievances covered 
both domestic and foreign policy. In this way, anti-normalization and 
Palestine consciousness became important incubators for the Egyptian 
revolution. 
Ironically, a degree of apathy on Arab issues appeared to follow; even 
demonstrations during Israel’s 2006 war on Lebanon and its 2008–2009 
war on Gaza were poorly attended. This was mainly because those who 
had poured into the streets during Palestine’s intifadas were now con-
sumed with an all-out domestic struggle against the regime. Activists 
were forging links with the labor movement, together protesting the 
corrupt state elite’s privatization of the public sector, resulting in falling 
wages, rising inflation, and unemployment, compounded by the slashing 
of public welfare, education, and health subsidies. However, the lack of 
attention to Israeli policies and Palestine in these years was also partly 
due to powerful state media campaigns to discredit Islamic resistance 
movements like Hamas and Hizballah. The secular bias of much of the 
Egyptian Left, which was reluctant to rally support for Islamist move-
ments even when victims of Israeli brutality, also played a role.29 As 
for the Muslim Brothers, while they officially supported the anti-Israeli 
resistance, their political ambitions led them to toe the government line,30 
though they did organize aid donations separately, mainly through their 
“Palestine Committees” and the professional syndicates they control.31
When the Egyptian revolution erupted on 25 January 2011, then, popu-
lar support for Palestine seemed at a nadir. Yet within weeks not only 
had Palestine once again been pushed to the foreground, but the focus of 
mainstream political debate on Israel shifted from anti-normalization to 
whether or not Egypt should rethink—or even cancel—the peace treaty. 
Thus, while the late 2000s had made clear the limits of Egyptian support 
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for the Palestine issue, the early months of 2011 demonstrated its endur-
ing resonance among the Egyptian people. 
The egyPTian RevoluTion oF 2011: anTi-Zionism and PalesTine 
in TahRiR squaRe
If the anti-Mubarak movement had been focusing on domestic rather 
than foreign policy matters in recent years, the 2011 revolution rep-
resented a peak in public consciousness and expression of the nexus 
between the two. The popularization of the slogans “Bread, freedom, 
human dignity” alongside “Raise your head high, you are Egyptian!” sug-
gests this link: citizens connected their impoverishment and the erosion 
of Egyptian prestige internationally with Mubarak’s subservience to U.S. 
and Israeli directives, and his personal profiteering from such policies. 
This subtle connection was made more explicit by banners, chants, and 
songs denouncing rising food prices, plummeting wages, and privatiza-
tion, intermingled with slogans condemning foreign interference under 
Mubarak, demanding an end to the QIZ agreements and Egyptian natural 
gas sales to Israel, and proclaiming Mubarak a U.S. and Israeli stooge 
(‘amil). The focus on Israel was particularly clear: images of Mubarak 
adorned with Israeli symbols appeared, along with banners in Hebrew 
asking him to leave and chants and signs saying that he would be wel-
come in Tel Aviv. 
Identity narratives during the first eighteen days of the revolution—
during which Mubarak was driven from office—did not foreground 
Palestine per se but highlighted the Egyptian people’s rejection of for-
eign interference and Zionism. Immediately after Mubarak’s 11 February 
exit, however, the repertoires and discourse of “January 25th” were 
expanded to include anti-Zionism and commitment to Palestine. With 
Mubarak gone, a collective decision was taken by several revolution-
ary youth groups to replace the permanent occupations of Tahrir and 
other squares with mass national demonstrations every Friday (a strat-
egy intended to maintain pressure on the authorities and communicate 
popular demands, while responding to calls for a “return to normalcy” in 
public space). The very first such demonstrations on 18 February, just a 
week after Mubarak’s departure, were attended by an estimated 3 million 
Egyptians and abounded in explicitly pro-Palestinian chants and state-
ments, including “To Jerusalem we’re going; martyrs in our millions!”32 
Palestinian scarves, flags, slogans, and symbols proliferated alongside 
Egyptian flags and symbols, and Tunisian, Libyan, and other Arab flags 
also began to appear. These all became recurrent features of subsequent 
demonstrations.
For the next four months, domestic and foreign policy goals were regu-
larly pursued simultaneously. A prime example was the mass demonstra-
tion in Tahrir Square on 13 May. The main theme for the demonstration 
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was to have been Palestine (as part of the Nakba commemorations dis-
cussed below). However, as a result of a vicious attack several days before 
by Islamist extremists on Coptic Christians in the Cairo neighborhood 
of Imbaba, when fifteen people were killed and three Coptic churches 
burned, the youth coalitions decided to rename the demonstration “The 
Friday of National Unity and the Palestinian Cause.”33 
There was no single authoritative “leadership” of the revolution. 
Rather, there was coordination between a number of organizations, 
parties, and movements that had been active in anti-Mubarak mobi-
lization well before 25 January 2011. Of these groups, most had also 
been engaged in Palestine activism in the past. Reflecting the spontane-
ous momentum of January 2011, some of these organized to form the 
Revolutionary Youth Coalition (RYC) on 6 February in order to coordinate 
demands and demonstrations more effectively. The RYC became one of 
the leading decision-making bodies in subsequent weeks. It comprised, 
for example, the 6 April Youth Movement, which had formed in 2008 to 
support the momentous textile workers’ strike in al-Mahalla al-Kubra 
and was critical in preparing for 25 January. The RYC also hosted the 
Muslim Brotherhood Youth who, in an important generational split, had 
defied their leadership’s orders to stay away from the protests called for 
25 January. Also in the RYC were the Youth in Support of the Al-Baradei 
[Presidential] Campaign; the leftist Justice and Freedom Youth Movement; 
the youth of the liberal Democratic Front, Ghad, and Nasserist al-Karama 
parties; and the National Association for Change Youth. 
Tens of thousands of demonstrators in Tahrir Square in Cairo mark the Nakba, 13 May 2011. 
(Khaled Desouki/AFP/Getty Images)
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Also active in mobilizing for 25 January was the group Kuluna Khalid 
Said (“We Are All Khaled Said”), which formed in 2010 to protest the 
police killing of a young Internet activist and had a strong popular base. 
The labor movement, which had undergone an unprecedented renais-
sance since the 2000s, formed the new Egyptian Independent Union 
Federation (EIUF) in the early days of the revolution. Other, less ortho-
dox, participants were the “Ultras,” associations of football club support-
ers with significant experience dealing with police violence.
Throughout 2011, these groups continued to be vocal in their hostility 
to Israel and commitment to Palestine. Almost all participated, as orga-
nizations, in the commemoration of the Palestinian Nakba in May 2011. 
In short, political, (proto-)revolutionary activism in Egypt, whether on 
domestic or foreign policy issues, was carried out by the same groups 
with shared concerns, if to differing degrees. The declaration issued in 
late June by the newly formed EIUF exemplifies the importance of the 
Palestine and Israel issues to an organization whose professional con-
cerns are by definition domestic: 
We affirm our complete support for the right of the 
Palestinian Arab people to create an independent state 
in the whole of Palestine, and their right to use whatever 
means of resistance to achieve their rights . . . one of the 
principal reasons for our rejection of the old Egyptian 
Trade Union Federation is its subservience to the state 
and the National Democratic Party, and its participation 
in a visit to occupied Jerusalem and its failure to take any 
position opposing the policy of normalization.34 
Speaking in December 2011, members of the RYC Executive Bureau 
recall the turn to Arab issues immediately after Mubarak’s fall. Islam Lutfi 
and Amr Ezz, then representing the Muslim Brotherhood and 6 April Youth 
movements, respectively, describe it as a natural progression in their pri-
orities at the time: “We were observing events in Libya and Yemen and 
began coordinating with other Arab revolutionary youth movements . . . 
we believe that Arab unity exists, but from below, not from the top-down. 
. . . For us, Palestine was always a central issue.”35
new RePeRToiRes: FRom TahRiR To The “ThiRd inTiFada”
Mubarak’s forced exit in February opened up space for sustained mobi-
lization on both domestic and foreign policy issues that lasted until early 
summer. A new sense of empowerment led Egyptians to challenge all 
authority structures, with strikes and purges in factories, banks, unions, 
syndicates, media outlets, and universities. When Mubarak’s last cabinet 
was toppled in March, the new prime minister, Essam Sharaf, and the 
new foreign minister, Nabil al-Arabi, were both nominated by representa-
tives from Tahrir. 
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Al-Arabi made an immediate break with the reactive mode of foreign 
policy under Mubarak by announcing, in April, the imminent opening 
of the Rafah crossing, and by describing the siege of Gaza as a “shame-
ful practice.” He also stated plainly that all Egypt’s international agree-
ments signed were open to revision.36 Cairo’s success, after many failed 
attempts, in brokering the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agreement in 
May was attributed by many to the fall of the old regime and the more 
even-handed and independent approach of Egypt’s new mediators.37 
These new policies received widespread popular support and acclaim 
from across the political spectrum.38 It appeared that the foreign policy 
realignments demanded by Egypt’s protesters were underway.39 
Meanwhile, thousands-strong marches toward the Israeli embassy 
in Giza had become a regular event. Successive demonstrations were 
held outside the embassy on 8 April, 29 April, and 6 May. As veteran 
Palestinian activist and Cairo-based writer Abdel Qadir Yassin observed, 
“the revolutionaries stayed in Tahrir until they removed Mubarak, then 
they directed themselves to the Israeli embassy.”40 Setting out from Tahrir 
Square during every Friday demonstration, protesters’ chants included 
“Arm us, arm us, to Gaza, send us!” “The people want the liberation of 
Palestine!” and “Where is Israel? The Egyptian people are here!” 
The marches and demonstrations occurred in the context of soar-
ing popular expressions of hostility toward Israel and sympathy for the 
Palestinian cause, but also of the preparations then underway to com-
memorate the Palestinian Nakba on 15 May. The initiative was launched 
from Palestine via the “Third Intifada” Facebook page and was embraced 
by activist networks across the Arab world. Several Egyptian civil society 
associations and parties disseminated the initial call, while organizers 
such as the RYC incorporated references to Palestine in their posters 
and online flyers before each Friday demonstration. Egyptian Facebook 
groups such as “The Liberation of Jerusalem Begins with the Liberation 
of Cairo” and “The Preparatory Committee for the Third Palestinian 
Intifada” immediately formed and linked to the Palestinian “Third 
Intifada” page. Activists in Palestine and Egypt forged new online con-
nections after January 2011.41
As had long been the case in Palestine activism, participation in the 
15 May preparations and demonstrations crossed generational, party, 
and political divisions. Participant groups included Kifaya, the RYC, 
the Nasserists, the Islamist-leaning Labor party, and the Revolutionary 
Socialists. New groups, like the “Popular Committees in Defence of the 
Revolution” set up to protect local neighborhoods42 and student organiza-
tions such as the “Association of Supporters of the Palestinian Revolution” at 
Cairo University, all played roles. The latter intentionally revived the name 
of its leftist-Nasserist predecessor, which had helped spark the 1972 dem-
onstrations against Sadat’s inaction against Israel. Reflecting the coali-
tions of the later anti-Mubarak movement, however, the new group’s 
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participants came from across the political spectrum.43 The organizers’ 
demands reflected continuity with previous Palestine committees, includ-
ing the right of return for all Palestinian refugees, the permanent open-
ing of the Rafah crossing, the end of Egyptian gas exports to Israel, and 
the release of all Palestinians imprisoned in Egypt. One new demand was 
added: “cancellation of all the humiliating agreements and treaties, and 
boycott of all commercial and political relations with Israel.”44
The range of participants was mirrored in the diversity of the narra-
tives that converged on the Palestine issue. Prayers were held spontane-
ously at many demonstrations, and there were also Arabist and leftist 
songs and slogans, testifying to the ongoing popularity of the 1952 rev-
olution’s artistic canon and the anti-establishment repertoire of singer 
Sheikh Imam and poets Ahmad Fuad Nigm and Zein al-Abidin Fuad. 
Pamphlets for 15 May were put out by new (often online) groups that 
employed both Arabist and Islamic framing,45 as well as by organizations 
directly involved in the Third Intifada campaign, which used more leftist-
Arabist language. One such pamphlet, which emphasized that “anti-Zionist 
Jews are our allies” and called Mubarak “a Zionist occupier of our own 
skin,” opened with Amal Dunqul’s “Do Not Reconcile,” a poem rooted in 
Egypt’s leftist anti-normalization tradition that referred to both Egyptian 
and Palestinian towns as being under occupation.46 
Egyptian organizers of the Nakba commemoration events oversaw an 
ambitious three-day program of daily dawn prayers and mass demonstra-
tions in Tahrir Square, at the Israeli embassy, outside the ambassador’s 
residence in the Cairo suburb of Maadi, and outside the Israeli consulate 
in Alexandria. Given the ferment underway, activists stressed that “there 
was no need to mobilize; people were gathering spontaneously.”47 
Also planned was an aid convoy to the Gaza border that was to depart 
from Tahrir on 14 May but that was largely thwarted by the military 
authorities. On the appointed day, as participants assembled in Tahrir for 
departure, military orders were dispatched to all tourist offices forbid-
ding them to release the buses hired. Those able to find other means of 
transport proceeded regardless, but were stopped at the Al-Salam Bridge 
in Ismailiyya and ordered to turn back. Instead, many held protest sit-
ins at the bridge,48 whereas others continued on to Rafah with public 
transportation.49 Another reason for the failure of the aid convoy was the 
recurring division within the opposition based on levels of quietism vis-
à-vis the authorities. Organizers complained that the Muslim Brotherhood 
had used Tahrir Square platforms to discourage participation; indeed, 
members were ordered not to take part.50 Some tried to participate on an 
individual basis but returned at the first military roadblock.51 As in previ-
ous decades, coalitions working on Palestine included Islamists from a 
range of groups, except the largest. 
Meanwhile, the 13 May Tahrir Square demonstration in support 
of Palestine and national unity was a great success, drawing crowds 
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estimated at a million people. Smaller gatherings outside the Israeli 
embassy, however, were subjected to unexpected violence from the mili-
tary that continued for all three days devoted to honoring the Nakba. 
From Friday through Sunday, security and military police chased, tear-
gassed, and fired at protesters, using the most vicious tactics on the last 
day.52 Ultimately, the attacks served to link the current authorities with 
the same U.S. and Israeli interests Mubarak was seen as having served 
for decades. In a eulogy for Atif Yehya, a protester killed at the embassy 
on 15 May, journalist Naglaa’ Bedeir wrote, “the youth heading to the 
embassy simply wanted to send a message to the Zionist enemy that revo-
lutionary Egypt considers it an enemy and supports the Palestinian inti-
fada,” adding that Atif was a young man who had respected the army.53 
The security forces’ behavior at the embassy demonstrations in May 
exacerbated the already growing anger at the ruling Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which appeared increasingly reluctant to 
bring Mubarak to trial, trace stolen public funds, and overhaul govern-
ment ministries. By late spring, the realization that their demands were 
not being met by the ruling generals led the revolutionaries back to their 
tactics of January. The renewed occupation of public squares began on 
8 July, with slogans such as “returning to Tahrir” and “retribution for the 
martyrs” killed by the authorities since January 2011. Yet although the 
priority for mobilization had reverted to domestic demands, Palestine and 
its flags and slogans continued to be visible, having become permanent 
fixtures in popular protests.54 
bucking The TRend: The isRaeli embassy PRoTesTs
On 17 August, the focus of mobilization again turned to foreign policy. 
That day, Israeli forces shot dead five Egyptian officers and guards and 
wounded others at the Sinai border. The act unleashed a wave of anger, 
breaking the previous months’ trend of domestic focus. This confirmed 
the enduring strength of Egyptian grievances against Israel and their 
capacity to resurge at any Israeli provocation. Defying an easy calibration 
of their priority demands in the revolution, protesters now shifted the 
focus squarely on the peace treaty with Israel. 
Activists declared an indefinite occupation outside the Israeli embassy 
in Giza as well as ongoing protests outside the ambassador’s residence 
and the Israeli consulate in Alexandria. There were also demonstrations 
in the provincial towns of Fayyum, Beheira, Ismailiyya, Suez, Mansura, 
and Luxor, among others. Citizens spoke of the need to restore their 
wounded dignity and protect the sanctity of Egyptian land and life 
from the Zionists. There was a heightened emphasis on Israel-related 
demands, such as expelling the ambassador, closing the embassy, sev-
ering all diplomatic and economic ties, and renegotiating or abrogat-
ing the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.55 Activists and politicians alike 
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underlined that “Egypt after January 25th is different from what it used 
to be.”56
For three days, protesters launched fireworks at the Israeli flag on top 
of the high-rise building where the embassy was located, trying to set 
it on fire. Then, on 20 August, a house painter named Ahmad al-Shahat 
from Al-Sharqiya governorate scaled all twenty-one stories, took down 
the Israeli flag, and raised the Egyptian flag to cheering crowds. He 
was instantly hailed as a national hero, his act generating huge popular 
acclaim and media interest.57 Numerous opinion pieces reflected on the 
meaning of his act, connecting it with historical precedents in which 
Egyptians had confronted Israel, such as Suleiman Khater.58 While some 
cautioned that the event had brought no concrete victory, all agreed on 
its symbolic power.59 Thousands more demonstrated outside the Israeli 
embassy the following Friday, 26 August, dubbed the “Friday of the 
Expulsion of the Ambassador.”
Al-Shahat’s symbolic precedent was tested two weeks later when the 
Israeli flag was restored and Egyptian authorities erected a wall—painted 
with the colors of the Egyptian flag—around the embassy building. This 
sparked instant comparisons with Mubarak’s wall along the Rafah border, 
also built for the sake of Israeli security. A demonstration (nicknamed 
“Hammers Friday”) was spontaneously called for 9 September to bring 
down the wall and expel the ambassador. With a demonstration on elec-
toral reform (titled “Correcting the Path”) already planned that Friday for 
Tahrir Square, hundreds of the protesters set out from the Tahrir dem-
onstration for the embassy. By evening, they had brought down the wall. 
Some of the protesters scaled the building and removed the Israeli flag; 
some managed to enter one of the embassy floors and hurled documents 
from the windows. The entire diplomatic staff was evacuated under 
Egyptian commando escort, while military police launched a large-scale 
clampdown that resulted in three deaths, 1,049 injuries, and thirty-eight 
arrests. Despite these losses, the events of 9–10 September were seen as 
another popular victory: the government had failed to respond to citi-
zens’ demands, and they had expelled the ambassador themselves.
Still, the embassy protests had been marred by a certain degree of 
breakdown in consensus. The Muslim Brotherhood, repeating its opt-out 
from the Nakba events in May, stayed away from August’s “Friday of the 
Expulsion of the Ambassador,” citing Ramadan prayers.60 Further divi-
sions surfaced in September as some groups feared that the authorities 
had manipulated events to provoke the destruction of the wall and thus 
justify extending the emergency law.61 In different ways, these instances 
confirmed the consensus that domestic change had to be secured before 
pursuing foreign policy agendas. 
Yet overall, the embassy protests were able to align various political 
groups and raise the ceiling of collective demands, formalizing a focus on 
the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty that recalled the debates of the 1980s. 
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On 21 August, public figures from thirteen political parties, organizations, 
and movements, including four presidential candidates, the RYC, and 
rights activists at the Hisham Mubarak Law Centre, petitioned the mili-
tary council with a number of demands. These included the suspension 
of diplomatic and economic ties with Israel and Egyptian redeployment 
in Sinai, but also “stopping Israeli military fleets’ 
use of the Suez Canal . . . handing over the killers 
of Egyptian martyrs [of 17 August] for trial before 
Egyptian courts, and informing the Security Council 
of Israel’s violations.”62 
Like the Palestinian intifadas of 1987 and 2000, 
this had been a moment when citizens, acting 
spontaneously, had taken the lead, with activists 
and political organizations building on their ini-
tiative. Reflecting on the embassy protests, RYC 
Executive Committee member Islam Lutfi observed, 
the “Egyptian people have a profound yet unpub-
licized creed that Israel is the enemy.”63 Kifaya cofounder Abdel Halim 
Qandil remarked, “the presence of Israel in Egypt will gradually waste 
away: the Egyptians have collectively broken their barriers of fear.”64
At the same time, activists displayed a careful and pragmatic concern 
not to push Egypt into an untimely military confrontation.65 There was 
a strong sense that the interdependence between domestic and foreign 
policy change required a strategic sequence in which the former should 
enable the latter. This was pointedly suggested in the abovementioned 
petition of 21 August, which, after endorsing the protesters’ demands to 
expel the Israeli ambassador and renegotiate the peace agreement, noted 
that Egyptians needed to unite and solve their internal problems in order 
to effectively challenge Israel.66 
The evacuation of the Israeli embassy in September was followed by 
renewed focus on domestic developments. The first parliamentary elec-
tions of the post-Mubarak era had been called, with the first of four 
rounds scheduled for 28 November. For some months, new party forma-
tion had been underway as a result of a change in Egypt’s electoral law in 
March. This period revealed the impact of the revolution on certain ossi-
fied political structures, but also saw increasing fragmentation. Of par-
ticular significance was the Muslim Brotherhood’s decision to claim a part 
in the revolution (after having forbidden its members from participating 
in the 25 January protests) by forming the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) 
to stand in the forthcoming elections. When the Brotherhood leadership 
banned its membership from joining any party other than the FJP, many 
young members left or were expelled. One group of former Brothers 
joined with 6 April members and others to form the Egyptian Current 
Party. Once campaigning got underway in early November, domestic 
politics and its divisions became a national preoccupation.
The embassy protests 
aligned various politi-
cal groups and raised 
the ceiling of collective 
demands, formalizing 
a focus on the Egyptian-
Israeli peace treaty that 
recalled the debates 
of the 1980s.
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Meanwhile, by late summer many Egyptians were gravely concerned 
about the future of their revolution in light of increasing attacks by the 
military council, military and civilian police, and state media. The SCAF, 
which had secured its position with a constitutional declaration in March 
2011, had initially viewed public protests as a sort of “pressure release” 
it could instrumentalize to pose as “protector of the revolution.” At the 
same time, and in line with its consolidation of power, it increasingly 
turned to violence against protesters on the pretext that the demonstra-
tions endangered national “stability,”67 while state media echoed SCAF 
claims of “foreign hands” sabotaging the revolution.68 The revolutionary 
groups were divided at this stage as to the optimal response: while the 
SCAF’s attacks still appeared to be sporadic, most preferred not to alien-
ate the generals and tried to cooperate with their timetable for transition. 
The closing months of 2011, however, were marked by an upsurge 
in direct attacks on the revolutionaries. In October, over twenty died in 
a military crackdown on a largely Coptic demonstration protesting the 
burning of a church. The death toll climbed in November and December 
as military and civilian police targeted small sit-ins at Tahrir Square and 
outside the Egyptian cabinet, using teargas and live fire.69 At the same 
time, SCAF was tightening its grip on power. In mid-November the gen-
erals had stated that they would rule until a new president was elected 
and a new constitution was written, a process then expected to last into 
2013. They also attempted to preserve their privileges and immunity 
from parliamentary scrutiny in a draft document of basic principles for 
the constitution, and on 7 December they stated that they, not the par-
liament, would select the constitutional committee. As the SCAF’s cred-
ibility fell and public outrage mounted, the FJP, which along with the 
Salafis’ Al-Nour party had swept parliamentary polls, kept largely silent. 
These developments brought thousands back onto the streets of down-
town Cairo in protest, met in turn with unprecedented violence, and the 
closure of several human rights organizations in mid-December. As 2012 
began, mobilization around foreign policy change seemed like a luxury 
of the distant past.
looking FoRwaRd: democRaTiZing egyPTian PoliTical sPace 
For all their immense achievements, Egyptian activists and citizens 
had to commemorate the first anniversary of 25 January 2011 with the 
slogan “the revolution continues.” The revolution’s ability to effect far-
reaching change had been severely hampered by the self-appointed 
SCAF. With regard to foreign policy, its very first communiqué had indi-
cated its positions, emphasizing that Egypt would respect all its interna-
tional treaties.70 Initially the momentum of the revolution had seemed 
to overwhelm the generals, but they were soon buoyed by the financial 
and political support of such regional and international players as Saudi 
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Arabia and the United States, which did not hide their displeasure with 
the foreign policy initiatives of Nabil al-Arabi,71 who was transferred to 
the less “sensitive” position of Arab League Secretary General by June. 
SCAF General Mohammed Al-Asaar’s visit to the United States in July 
2011 seemed to reassert continuity in Egyptian foreign policy, preserving 
U.S. business interests, the peace treaty, and hence economic and military 
aid to Egypt.72 Assuming the generals fulfill their latest promises to step 
down after the presidential elections announced for June 2012, the new 
incumbent will confront mutually reinforcing national and international 
business interests in the status quo, and the institutionalized securitiza-
tion of both U.S. and Egyptian foreign policy.
Furthermore, given the electoral sweep of the Islamist parties, the next 
government is unlikely to embark on a revisionist course in foreign pol-
icy.73 Despite the anti-Zionism and deep Palestinian sympathies of their 
constituencies, the Brotherhood and FJP leaderships have consistently 
taken positions of approximate alignment with the SCAF, which they have 
been able to impose thanks to highly disciplined internal structures.74 Nor 
has any change in position been signaled since the new FJP-dominated 
parliament was seated on 23 January 2012, and Muslim Brothers even 
participated in halting mass demonstrations on 30 January calling for 
hastening the end of military rule. Specifically on Palestine, the FJP pro-
gram speaks vaguely of a “just solution to the Palestinian issue” and the 
“right of Palestinians to their state.”75 Furthermore, Islamist leaders’ state-
ments have been inconsistent. Senior Muslim Brother Rashad Bayyumi 
declared in January 2012 that the FJP would put the Egyptian-Israeli 
peace treaty to a popular referendum.76 Yet a month earlier, FJP leaders 
had told U.S. senator John Kerry and U.S. ambassador Ann Patterson 
that they would respect Egypt’s international treaties. This position was 
echoed by Al-Nour leader Emad Abdel Ghaffour days later.77 
On the other hand, it is undoubtedly true, as the revolutionaries 
affirm, that “Egypt will never be the same again.” A new factor has been 
irreversibly inserted into every high politics calculation in Egypt, namely 
the popular will and the democratizing impact of its political pressure. 
The SCAF’s inability to insulate itself from the impact of popular mobi-
lization was demonstrated by the outrage over the Israeli military’s kill-
ing of Egyptian troops in August, forcing it to allow people to express 
their anger. The generals made no attempt to dampen the celebrations of 
Ahmad Al-Shahat as a national hero or to prevent protesters from tearing 
down the embassy wall. They even had to seek an apology from Israel—
and, remarkably, were obliged—though this act was publicly scorned. 
Even if these moves were intended as a pressure release, and for all the 
self-assurance of the SCAF, this episode served as a reminder of the pre-
cariousness of Egyptian-Israeli “peace.” 
In January 2012, activists’ mere preparations to commemorate the rev-
olution’s first anniversary extracted several concessions from the SCAF, 
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including the release of almost 2,000 political prisoners (out of a total 12,000 
imprisoned since February 2011) and the partial lifting of the emergency 
law. Yet these gestures did not stop millions turning out on 25 January, and 
thousands on subsequent days of protests, calling openly for the fall of mili-
tary rule. At the time of writing, preparations are underway for a national 
day of strikes and civil disobedience on the anniversary of Mubarak’s 
departure, 11 February, with the same aim and significant potential.
The revolution has also “democratized” the language and structures 
of Egyptian politics: statements from presidential candidates78 and par-
ties79 throughout 2011 sought to reflect the public’s positions with their 
overwhelming focus on the peace treaty with Israel. In shaking up the 
old structures of the Islamist movement, the revolution generated new 
formations that are willing to break ranks and expose their erstwhile 
seniors’ silence on domestic and foreign policy issues. The language of 
the Egyptian Current Party, for example, is hostile to Israel and vocal 
about Palestinian self-determination and resistance.80 Indeed, by late 
January 2012, even FJP sympathizers were expressing disappointment 
with the party’s deferent behavior to the SCAF, labeling it opportunism 
or even betrayal.81The bounds of legitimate policy have been significantly 
altered, and popular trends will likely act as a check on Israeli militarism, 
mediated by pressure from Egyptian officials.82 There can be no return 
to the Egyptian-Israeli cooperation that characterized the Mubarak era.
Throughout 2011, depending on context and political opportunity, 
protesters and revolutionaries chose their battles and the optimal timing 
for them, and in so doing were able to redraw the boundaries of offi-
cial policy significantly. The pattern of popular mobilization reflected an 
unarticulated sequence of priorities whereby domestic change was to pre-
cede or indeed facilitate foreign policy overhaul. The latter would in turn 
involve confrontation with Israel and restoration of Palestinian rights, to 
be pursued pragmatically, as domestic developments allow.83 Indeed, it 
is important not to impose too strict an analysis on the political strate-
gies of 2011. Protesters have identified and seized political opportunities 
to mobilize on different dimensions of their domestic and foreign policy 
demands depending on context, such that they have surfaced together 
and also separately at different times.
The popular commitment to Palestine and against Israel in Egypt is 
powerful, because it is based not only on a sense of justice and humani-
tarianism but also on an emotive sense of shared identity and fraternity 
in the struggle against a common threat. Indeed Egypt’s 2011 revolution 
built on the foundations of four decades of spontaneous popular protest 
and activism, in which anti-Zionism and Palestine were consistently pres-
ent, crossing class and religious divides. This rich tradition will further 
democratize the political scene between the authorities and contenders 
for power in Egypt, despite the retrenchment of the military and security 
forces’ positions in the latter months of 2011. Indeed, as the year came to 
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a close, protesters were firmly focused on challenging the military coun-
cil, yet the Sinai gas pipeline was blown up for the tenth time, and the 
new Israeli ambassador in Cairo reported for duty without an embassy, 
as all efforts to find a new landlord had so far failed.
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